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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the prioritisation of healthcare projects where there
is a concern about health inequalities, but the decision maker is reluctant to
make explicit quantitative value judgements and the data systems only allow
the measurement of health at an aggregate level. Our analysis begins with a
standard welfare economic model of healthcare resource allocation. We show
how - under the assumption that the healthcare projects under consideration
have a small impact on individual health - the problem can be reformulated as
one of nding a particular subset of the class of e¢ cient solutions to an implied
multicriteria optimisation problem. Algorithms for nding such solutions are
readily available, and we demonstrate our approach through a worked example
of treatment for clinical depression.
Key words: health inequalities, mathematical programming, multicriteria
decision analysis (MCDA)
1. Introduction
How best to take into account health inequalities is an ongoing issue in the
theory and practice of health economics. In many developed countries, policy
makers and the public seem to care about inequalities in population health (see
Morton and Airoldi, 2009, for a discussion of the recent history of health in-
equality policy in the UK), and demonstrate this concern through both policy
action and surveys of social values. This preference has been an important pre-
occupation for health economists over the last two decades or so (Williams and
Cookson, 2000; McIntyre and Mooney, 2007). However, it is still not clear how
concerns about inequality should be captured in practical appraisal procedures,
whether at the national level (for example, economic evaluation of technologies,
development of national guidelines) or at the local level (prioritisation of spend
by health authorities on the ground). A particular di¢ culty in connecting the-
ory to practice is that health planners are often very reluctant to explicitly state
parameters that reect di¤erences in importance of one section of the population
rather than another: it is hard to imagine a Minister of Health announcing that
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a QALY accruing to a smoker was to be valued as 80% of a QALY for a non-
smoker, for example. Yet most forms of quantitative modelling seem to require
such explicit tradeo¤ statements. A further di¢ culty in connecting theory to
practice is that most health planners work with aggregate data and population
averages, and do not have access to information about individual members of
the population - indeed for many purposes, information about the distribution
of health status in the entire population may simply not be collected, and plan-
ners have to rely on extrapolation from surveys or eld studies. Yet welfare
economic models construct their models of societal value by building upwards
from an individual base (see Østerdal, 2005).
In this paper, we consider the question of how to prioritise in the face of
incomplete information about values and aggregated information about popula-
tion health through the lens of Multicriteria Optimisation (MCO). MCO deals
with the formulation of and solution procedures for optimisation problems where
there are multiple conicting objective functions which cannot be completely
traded o¤ against each other. Solving a MCO involves identifying all solu-
tions that are e¢ cient in the sense that they are optimal with respect to some
aggregate objective function within a family of possible functions, rather than
optimising a single unique objective function. Where the family of objective
function consists of all monotonically increasing functions, this MCO denition
of e¢ ciency collapses to the familiar concept of Pareto e¢ ciency. Thus, MCO
procedures side-step the problem of explicitly parameterising an objective func-
tion - the client for the analysis is presented with a number of "e¢ cient", but
possibly very di¤erent, solutions, between which they can choose directly. In
some cases the identication of e¢ cient solutions may be su¢ cient to arrive at
a choice (e.g. if there a single, or single acceptable, e¢ cient solution); but even
in other cases, where multiple e¢ cient solutions exist, there may be advantage
in focussing discussions on concrete choices between alternatives, rather than
on abstract and polarising questions of how much one values a health benet to
one sort of person rather than another sort of person.
This paper follows in a line of health economic papers that seek to apply
mathematical programming approaches in health economics (Birch and Gafni,
1992; 1993; Johannesson and Weinstein, 1993; Stinnett and Paltiel, 1996; Earn-
shaw and Dennett, 2003; Anand, 2003; Epstein et al., 2007; Cleary et al., 2010).
It has long been recognised that the ordering derived from the cost per QALY
rule can be interpreted as a heuristic solution to a more general, but implicit,
optimisation problem (Weinstein and Zeckhauser, 1973; Dantzig, 1998). These
more general mathematical programming formulations model healthcare pri-
oritisation as resource allocation subject to a xed budget constraint, where
the opportunity costs of choosing a particular healthcare investment are explic-
itly modelled. The mathematical programming framework can take account
of issues such as indivisibilities, returns to scale, interactions between alterna-
tive investments, and the availability of recourse actions if investment decisions
taken under uncertainty do not yield satisfactory results. The paper of Anand
(2003) in particular is similar in spirit to the present work in that the author
observes the healthcare resource allocation problem evokes conicting values
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and considers how optimal solutions may di¤er depending on the choice of ob-
jective function. However, to the best of our knowledge, MCO has not yet been
proposed in a health economics context.
Equity can be captured in various ways in the context of the mono-criterion
models already proposed in the literature. For example, a social planner can
impose through constraints that a certain amount of resources are devoted,
or a certain amount of health is delivered, to some particular group (Stinnett
and Paltiel, 1996). Such an approach may - arguably - be appropriate in
certain situations (for example, if one population group deserves redress for
some previous wrong, then a mathematical program could be constrained so
that they are compensated to the extent that they were previously wronged).
But is has clear disadvantages, in general. For example, it may be simply
impossible to nd a solution that meets all constraints. Imposing constraints
on lower levels of resource consumption in particular may have perverse e¤ects,
where required expenditure limits for one group may only be possible if they
are provided with ine¤ective or indeed harmful treatment.
In this paper we seek to make a number of contributions:
 we introduce MCO concepts and relate these to the welfare economic
theory of health as it relates to health inequality;
 we show that the commonly used but ad hoc approach of representing
equity concerns through constraints recommends solutions that do not
satisfy a multicriteria e¢ ciency condition;
 we show through a worked example that MCO is workable technology for
healthcare resource allocation, where project selection is modelled through
continuous or discrete decision variables.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline a basic model
of healthcare resource allocation. In Section 3 we present key MCO concepts
and demonstrate how they relate to the model of the previous section. In
Section 4 we present an example based on prioritising treatments for depression
in England, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Our model
2.1. The (health-related) welfare economic frame
How should a social planner think about choice between alternative health-
care investments? A common approach in health economics is to assume that
such investment decisions are only value-relevant insofar as they have inuence
on the health of a population captured through a Health-Related Social Wel-
fare Function or HR-SWF. A substantial theoretic literature exists on the
underpinning normative theory - see Culyer (1989), Wagsta¤ (1991), Bleichrodt
(1997), Williams and Cookson (2000), Østerdal (2005) and Epstein et al. (2009)
- as well as a growing body of empirical research (Dolan, Shaw, Tsuchiya and
Williams 2005; Dolan, Edlin and Tsuchiya 2008).
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The core idea behind the HR-SWF can be presented as follows. Let
N=f1; :::; i; :::; Ng be the index set for the members of the population. A
very general form for the HR-SWF is as follows:X
j2N
wju (hj) (1)
The variable hj 2 R+ represents a measure of the lifetime health for person
j. The concave increasing function u : R+ 7 ! R+ captures the idea that the
more health someone has, the less valuable (to the social planner) a marginal
increase is. The scaling factor wj reects that the health of certain people may
be valued more than other people, because of certain characteristics of these
people (for example, some of them may be smokers, or may have dependants).
If wj = w8j, then this HR-SWF is interpersonally anonymous in the sense that
the same health benet (for example, one QALY) is valued the same when one
individual receives it as when another individual at same level of health does.
The HR-SWF presented in (1) is separable in the sense that it is possible
to value a health gain to one person without knowing anything about what
health gains accrue to other people. This is not as limiting as it might ap-
pear: many non-additive HR-SWFs (e.g. the CES function) can be transformed
by a monotonically increasing transformation to an additive function, and are
thus strategically equivalentto an additive function, in the sense that in any
optimisation problem, the additive transformed version of the function can re-
place with original non-additive function without changing the optimal solution.
There are however functions  in particular the Rawlsian maximin function 
that cannot be be transformed thus, and there are situations where one may
wish to model interdepencies between persons - for example in the case where
there are "caring externalities" (Culyer, 1989)- and so this is not a completely
vacuous assumption.
Such welfare models are indispensable for theoretic analyses, but but have
limitations for purposes of practical use in an appraisal or resource allocation
context. A particularly practical di¢ culty with this model is that it seems to
necessitate measuring the health of every individual in a population and plan-
ning based on that individual level data. This is unlikely to be possible. One
way round this di¢ culty is to work with a simpler function. Where health
improvements are marginal, this can be justied. In particular, for health im-
provements  = (1; :::; j ; :::; N ) that are are "small" in the sense that the rst
order Taylor series u
 
h0j + 

= u
 
h0j

+
du(h0j)
dh j is an adequate approximation
of the u (hj)s, equation (1) can be simplied as:X
j2N
wju
 
h0j

+
X
j2N
du
 
h0j

dh
wjj (2)
Maximising equation (2) by varying  is thus equivalent to maximising
X
j2N
du(h0j)
dh wjj
. Thus knowledge of h0 = (h01; :::; h
0
j ; :::; h
0
N ) is not required directly, except
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through the derivatives.
Two arguments that can be used to justify the claim that investments typ-
ically have a "small impact on individual health" and hence justify the Taylor
series approximation are as follows:
 healthcare consumption occurs disproportionately late in life, and in-
deed disproportionately shortly before death (see Payne et al., 2007 for a recent
review), and so, logically speaking, this consumption can only have a rather
marginal impact on lifetime health;
 as is stressed in cost e¤ectiveness textbooks (e.g. Drummond et al.,
2005), healthcare investments decisions will normally be incremental (e.g. the
decision to upgrade from rst to second generation antipsychotics) and so if the
decision is negative, patients will not be denied treatment entirely, but rather
will be o¤ered a (perhaps only slightly) less e¤ective treatment.
Thus, while the framework of this paper is not always appropriate, it will be
in a wide range of common decision making settings.
Another possible setting where one might consider a health intervention
small is when the intervention has a small chance of a considerable health
benet. However, how to take equity into account in situations where outcomes
are risky remains a philosophically contentious issue, raising deep issues in the
foundations of decision theory and welfare economics (see e.g. Fleurbaey, 2010).
For the purposes of our present discussion, let us schematically distinguish an ex
ante and ex post view of the healthcare system: someone who takes the ex ante
view sees the role of the healthcare system as being to improve the quantity
and distribution of chances at health; someone who takes the ex post view sees
the role of the system as being to improve the quantity and distribution of
actual realised health outcomes. Thus, in the ex ante view, a small chance
of a considerable health benet is indeed a small (expected) health benet to
the individual; but someone who takes the ex post view would refuse to accept
this line of reasoning, observing that the individual will either experience the
considerable health benet or none at all, and in no event will they actually
experience a small health benet. Thus, insofar as small chances of considerable
benets are considered small under the ex ante view, and not under the ex
post view, the ex ante view is more compatible with our framework presented
here. To see how this might be relevant, consider that many public health
interventions will provide small increases in the chances of considerable health
benets (e.g. decreasing the salt content of bread will slightly decrease the risk
of stroke for everyone in the consuming population); thus taking an ex ante view
of equity may make it easier to justify considering decisions about investments
in such interventions within our framework.
To see how this framework might be used, consider a social planner who has
to choose between possible healthcare investment alternativesM=f1; :::; i; :::Mg
by choosing x = (x1; :::; xi; :::xM ) in some feasible set X  [0; 1]M . xi =0
represents the situation where some particular alternative i is unfunded, xi =1
where it is fully funded, and any intermediate values represent the situation
where it is partially funded. Associated with each investment decision xi is
a set of health improvements ij for each individual j. Suppose that health
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benets from di¤erent alternatives combine additively so that individual js
total health consequent on the allocation will be hj +
P
i2M
ijxi. Note that
if decision variables are constrained to be binary, horizontal equity judgements
may be embedded in this structure in the problem itself, in the sense that the
social planner may choose to consider "Cholinesterase inhibitors for Alzheimers
disease" as a single investment alternative, or to split it into "Cholinesterase
inhibitors for early to middle stage Alzheimers" and "Cholinesterase inhibitors
for late stage Alzheimers": the latter case represents a judgement that it would
be acceptable to prescribe in the early to middle stages only, and withdraw the
drug for patients in the later stages.
Given the approximation (2), the social planners problem can be written
as:
max
x
X
j2N
j
X
i2M
ijxi such that x 2 X (3)
where the weights j =
du(h0j)
dh wj . We stress that a higher j for individual
j may be driven either by
du(h0j)
dh (reecting poor health) or by wj (reecting
individual characteristics). This is an important analytic distinction. For
example, although government policy in England has recently prioritised health
gains for people of lower socio-economic status, our reading of the relevant
policy documents is not that socio-economic status itself is taken to have moral
signicance. Rather it is that people in the lower socio-economic classes have
poorer expected health, and it is this which is morally objectionable.
In this paper we will be consider two distinct versions of (3): in the continuous
version, each entry, xi takes a value in the closed interval [0; 1]; in the discrete
version, each entry xi takes a value in the discrete set f0; 1g. The choice between
discrete or continuous variables may depend, for example, on the underlying
healthcare technology (pharmaceutical provision for a particular population can
be implemented at any level between full and zero, but purchasing a fraction
of a dialysis centre may not be possible). Of course mixed versions with both
continuous and discrete versions are possible, but to discuss this case specically
would raise no new interesting issues. The relative appropriateness of modelling
healthcare investment decisions as continuous versus discrete variables has been
a source of contention in the literature (Birch and Gafni, 1992; Johannesson
and Weinstein, 1993). We do not take a view on the appropriateness of one
relative to the other in general, but consider that each is appropriate in at least
some situations, and this is su¢ cient justication for discussing both. In any
case, much of the time our discussion applies to both versions and so we will be
purposely non-specic about the domain of the variables.
It quite simple to reframe HR-SWF (3) in terms of aggregates rather than
individuals. Let the index set of subpopulations be P=f1; :::; k; :::; Pg and write
the index sets of members of the subpopulations asN1 = f1; :::; N1g;N2 = fN1+
1; :::; N2g:::NP = fNP 1+1; :::; NP g for suitable numbers 0 < N1 < N2 < :::NP
where . Then (3) is equivalent to:
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max
x
X
k2P
X
j2Nk
j
X
i2M
ijxi such that x 2 X (4)
If all members j of subpopulation k have the same weight Ak then (4) can
be rewritten as
max
x
X
k2P
X
j2Nk
Ak
X
i2M
ijxi such that x 2 X (5)
then by factoring out the Ak and interchanging summation signs, we get
max
x
X
k2P
Ak
X
i2M
X
j2Nk
ijxi such that x 2 X (6)
and if we rewrite ik =
X
j2Nk
ij 8i; k then (6) can in turn be rewritten as
max
x
X
k2P
Ak
X
i2M
ikxi such that x 2 X (7)
As it stands this model is unlikely to be usable to support resource allocation
in practical settings. For one thing, it is unlikely that a social planner who was
prepared to commit to a determinate wj . For another, any choice of u() would
also be contentious. And even if a function u() could be agreed upon, equation
(7) additionally requires the statement of the derivatives
du(h0j)
dh and hence in
general knowledge of the complete distribution of population health h0. Hence
there is likely to be uncertainty about the weights j and thus Ak. The purpose
of this paper is to propose some ways in that this uncertainty might be handled.
3. Multicriteria optimisation
3.1. Basic concepts
MCO is a generalisation of mathematical programming in which, rather than
a unique objective function, there are multiple, possibly conicting "criteria
functions". MCO falls within the general intellectual domain variously known as
Multicriteria Decision Making, Multicriteria Decision Analysis and Multicriteria
Decision Aid, henceforth referred to as MCDA (for review volumes see Belton
and Stewart, 2002 and Figueira et al., 2005).
MCDA is itself not a new idea in health economics. Indeed, multicriteria
techniques have been used in order to prioritise healthcare investments on a
more or less ad hoc basis for many years - see reviews by Mullen (2004), Devlin
and Sussex (2011), Airoldi and Morton (2011) and Morton et al. (forthcoming).
Generally such techniques have taken the form of some sort of additive scoring
and weighting method, either ad hoc, or within a formal framework such as
Multiattribute Utility Theory.
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A common approach to incorporating inequality aversion in such scoring
models is to dene an equity criterion, as for example in Wilson et al. (2006)
and Airoldi et al. (2011), alongside a health benet or e¤ectiveness criterion,
to assess performance on both criteria (possibly among others), weight criterion
scores and sum up. This may not be an ideal approach in general, because
equity, considered as a criterion, may plausibly not be preferentially independent
of other criteria, in the sense that how much one cares about a change in equity
may depend on the levels of other criteria. Such violations of preferential
independence violate the core assumptions of the additive value model. To see
the limitations of this approach, consider the example of Baltussen and Niessen
(2006). This model has a "cost-e¤ectiveness" criterion, a "severity of disease"
criterion, and two equity criteria, based on whether the disease is a disease of the
poor and whether it is a disease of the young respectively. The criterion "disease
of the poor" in particular has a weighting of 40, indicating that according to their
(illustrative) numbers, being designated a treatment for a "disease of the poor" is
worth 40 points in their value function. However, one could plausibly argue that
how many points one is prepared to give to a treatment because it is a "disease
of the poor" should depend on whether a treatment is considered to be e¤ective
or not. In the limit, one presumably would not be prepared to give 40 points
to a treatment for a treatment for a disease of the poor that was completely
ine¤ective and discredited (for comparison, in Baltussen and Niessens table,
this would far exceed the 5 points which the undoubtedly worthwhile "inpatient
care for acute schizophrenia" option earns).
An alternative approach to handling inequality aversion through capturing
equity as a criterion in an MCDA model is to consider the health gains to
di¤erent population groupings themselves as the multiple criteria. In such an
approach it is easy to relate the value model to formula (7). This overcomes the
theoretic di¢ culty about criterion independence. However, as noted above, a
drawback from the point of view of practical elicitation is that social planners are
likely to be extremely reluctant to state tradeo¤s between di¤erent population
subgroups directly. Hence an approach that can deal with uncertainty about
the weight parameters is required.
This leads us into our discussion of MCO. MCO problems are typically
written in the following notation, where P = f1; :::; Pg is the index set of a
set of criteria that a decision maker may wish to maximise. Observe that
the critical di¤erence from a standard mathematical program is that there are
multiple criteria functions, separated by commas, instead of a single objective
function.
max
x
W1(x); :::;WP (x) such that x 2 X (8)
We will write the vector (W1(x); :::;WP (x)) as W (x).
In the multicriteria setting, one way to dene the concept of e¢ ciency is as
follows.
Denition 1. A solution x0 is e¢ cient if there is a monotonically increasing
functional v() such that v(W (x))  v(W (x0))8x 2 X.
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This is slightly di¤erent from the more familiar denition for x0 to be ef-
cient (there has to be no solution x such that Wk(x)  Wk(x0)8k 2 P and
9ko:Wko(x) > Wko(x0)) but can be easily seen to be equivalent (to see that our
denition implies the usual denition, observe that if our denition holds but
not the familiar denition, v() cannot be increasing which is a contradiction;
if the familiar denition holds then we take v() = Wko() and so our denition
must hold). The reason for using this non-standard denition will become clear
in the ensuing.
For our purposes, however, this denition seems excessively general. We are
not interested in all possible functionals, but only those functionals that could be
reasonably described as inequality averse, and Denition 1 includes functionals
that model both inequality averse and inequality seeking preferences.
A renement of the concept of Denition 1 is to specify e¢ ciency relative
to the unit simplex Ao=f(A1; :::; AP ) 2 RP++ :
P
k2P
Ak=1g (the restriction that
weights sum to 1 is an arbitrary normalisation).
Denition 2. A solution x0 is convex e¢ cient if there is a set of weights
fA1; :::; AP g 2 Ao such that
X
k2P
AkWk(x) 
X
k2P
AkWk(x
0) 8x 2 X.
Solutions that are e¢ cient but not convex e¢ cient are called "unsupported"
e¢ cient solutions. It is well-known that in cases where the feasible set is con-
vex the set of e¢ cient and convex e¢ cient solutions coincides (Ehrgott, 2005).
Hence, if the feasible set is convex, there are no unsupported e¢ cient solutions.
A further renement of the concept of e¢ ciency is to specify e¢ ciency rela-
tive to the linear additive functional with weights in some given set A  Ao.
Denition 3. A solution x0 is A-e¢ cient if there is a set of weights fA1; :::; AP g 2
A such that
X
k2P
AkWk(x) 
X
k2P
AkWk(x
0) 8x 2 X.
Thus, the critical di¤erence between Denition 2 and Denition 3 is that the
former uses the whole of the weight simplex Ao and the latter uses a specic
subset of the weight simplex, A. Observe that since all A-e¢ cient solutions are
convex e¢ cient, no A-e¢ cient solutions are unsupported.
This renement is particularly relevant in our case, as some groups may
be clearly disadvantaged relative to others, and so may attract higher weights.
Hence, what may be useful to a social planner interested in solving (7) but
unsure of the values of the Aks is the A-e¢ cient solutions to a problem of the
form:
max
x
X
i2M
i1xi; :::;
X
i2M
iPxi such that x 2 X (9)
where A is dened by a set of constraints on weights (for example, perhaps
the weight associated with population 1 may be less than or equal to the three
quarters of the weight associated with population 2). As it happens, algorithms
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for nding A-e¢ cient solutions to MCO problems have been an active area for
research in recent years (Liesiö et al., 2007; Argyris et al., 2011).
3.2. Non-supported e¢ cient solutions
An example of e¢ cient but non-convex e¢ cient solutions can be constructed
in settings where the dimensions are gains to di¤erent population groups. In
the example of Figure 1, the social planner aims to maximise health gains to
population groups 1 and 2 and there are three discrete solutions a, b and c,
all of which are are e¢ cient, but only a and b are convex e¢ cient: any linear
isopreference line will pick out a or b as superior to c.
a
b
c
health gain to
population group 1
health gain
to
population
group 2
Figure 1. Three e¢ cient solutions, two of them convex e¢ cient
There is a rationale for considering point c as "better than" a or b, in the
sense that it is a "good compromise". Indeed, if the population groups are
sociologically meaningful entities, the members of which perceive themselves as
having common interests and the ability to undertake common actions (rather
than purely statistical constructs, such as socio-economic groups), then one
could view c as the likely outcome of some sort of bargaining process between
these entities. However, this seems to lead to a view of healthcare prioriti-
sation as a (perhaps implicit) negotiation between di¤erent sections of society
(the reader is referred to Hauck et al. (2004) for a fuller development of this
perspective). This choice is, however, incompatible with the analysis developed
in this paper, as such a solution would not be an A-e¢ cient solution to (9).
In the light of this analysis, it is interesting to consider the practice of impos-
ing equity constraints directly, as recommended by Stinnett and Paltiel (1996)
and others in the mono-criterion environment. To x ideas consider again the
case where there are two population groups. In that case, (9) specialises to:
max
x
X
i2M
i1xi;
X
i2M
i2xi such that x 2 X (10)
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In the case where population group 1 was worse o¤ than population group 2,
in our approach this could be captured in a weight constraint setA = f(A1; A2) :
(A1; A2) 2 R2++, A1 +A2=1 and A1  A2g. In contrast, in the mono-criterion
environment, when equity constraints are used, this concern about equity would
be captured by adding an additional constraint on the decision variables, and
the relevant math program would be:
max
x
X
i2M
i1xi +
X
i2M
i2xi such that x 2 X and
X
i2M
i1xi  B (11)
It is quite easy to show that, in the discrete version of this problem, there can
be values of B for which (11) has solutions which are not A-e¢ cient with respect
to (10). Figure 2 demonstrates this using the example of Figure 1. As noted
above, c is not convex e¢ cient, and hence cannot be A-e¢ cient. However, if B
is set as shown on the diagram (and so a is "cut o¤") and the (linear) isoquant
of the objective function is the diagonal line through c then c will be chosen as
an optimal solution to (11) over b. Hence, the policy recommendations that fall
out from the use of equity constraints cannot be justied within our framework.
Choices about how to model equity (e.g. about whether to model equity in
the constraints or in the objectives of a mathematical program) seem to be
made on quite casual grounds: it is important in our view that analysts should
understand that di¤erent models can lead, not only to di¤erent solutions, but
to di¤erent sorts of solutions.
c
health gain to
population group 1
health gain
to
population
group 2
B
b
a
Figure 2. c is optimal but not A-e¢ cient
3.3. Relation to classical view of economic inequality
There is a classical literature on the comparison of inequal distribution of
economic goods (such as income and health), motivated by the need to make
statements such as "income is distributed more unequally in the United States
than in the United Kingdom", and the aim of the current section is to compare
our framework with the ideas in that literature. The classical line of research,
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beginning with Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969), and given its denitive state-
ment in the rst edition of Sen (1997), seeks to understand the comparison of
di¤erent distributions of income through an analogy with the comparison of
gambles (i.e. distributions of probability mass). Intuitively, a risk averse de-
cision maker will like a monetary gamble more (less) if the probability mass is
concentrated (spread out), so that the expected value of the gamble remains
the same but there are lower (higher) chances of both better and worse out-
comes; in a similar way, an inequality averse social planner will like an income
distribution more (less) if the same amount of income is concentrated (spread
out) by transferring income from richer to poorer (poorer to richer) individuals.
This sort of observation gives a way to make inequality comparisons between
di¤erent distributions of income.
The clearest statement of the seminal result in this literature is the pa-
per of Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973). A slightly simplied version of
what these authors show is the following. For some real-valued total income
I and some natural number n of people, dene Z(I) as the set of possible or-
dered distributions I, i.e. vectors z = (z1; :::; zn) with z1  :::  zn and
nP
zi = I
i=1
. For z0 and z00 2 Z(I), the following conditions are equivalent: (i)
for all strictly Schur-concave social welfare functions v(), v(z0) > v(z00); (ii)
the Lorenz curve (showing cumulated income) associated with z0 is everywhere
(nonstrictly) above the Lorenz curve associated with z00; (iii) z0 can be obtained
from z00 by a series of ("Pigou-Dalton") transfers of income from rich to poor.
These three conditions provide di¤erent perspectives on the statement "z0 is a
more equal distribution of income than z00": (i) relates the concept of inequality
to an abstract mathematical concept, that of the Schur-concavity of a function;
(ii) provides a computational way to test for two distributions whether one is
denitely more unequal than another; and (iii) gives a constructive perspective,
showing how we might move from a less to a more equal distribution.
Extensions and variations of this approach have been widely studied in both
general economics and in health economics. For example in the economic main-
stream, Shorrocks (1983) shows how to compare distributions with di¤erent sum
total incomes using Generalised Lorenz curves. In health economics, Wagsta¤
(1991, 2002) discusses the use of "concentration curves" in the place of Lorenz
curves to determine which of two distributions are more unequal in the sense
that richer people are more healthy and poorer people are less healthy; Allison
and Foster (2006) and Sonne-Schmidt et al (2013) discuss how to compare dis-
tributions where only ordinal data relevant to well-being is available, by dening
improving (degrading) transfers of population between ordinal categories.
To highlight the relationship between this sort of approach and our approach
in the current paper, it is instructive to dene an e¢ ciency concept along the
lines of condition (i) of Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett. This denition is clearly
analogous to our Denitions 1-3, and comparing Denition 3 and Denition 4
may be a useful way of understanding the distinctive features of our approach
in relation to that of the classical economic inequality literature.
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Denition 4. A distribution z0 is DSS-e¢ cient if there is a strictly Schur-
concave functional v() such that v(W (z))  v(W (z0))8z 2 Z(I).
We highlight three di¤erences between Denitions 1-3 and Denition 4.
 Firstly, Denition 4 contains no mention of the increasingness of the func-
tion v(). One way to look at this is to observe that as the result is
restricted to distributions of some determined amount I of total income,
there will not be two distributions z0 and z00 2 Z(I): z0  z00. Therefore,
in denition Denition 4 the issue of increasingness or otherwise of v()
does not arise. As noted, Shorrocks (1983) and other authors have ex-
plored the situation where the assumption of constant sum total income
is relaxed.
 Secondly, the framework of Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett embeds a symme-
try assumption in the sense that all Schur-concave functions will assign
the same value to all permutations. In our framework, we make no such
symmetry assumption: indeed in our original statement of the HR-SWF
in equation (1), we explicitly allow that the health of members of the
population may be weighted di¤erently (e.g. because their poor health is
self-inicted). If all weights wj are the same, then j e¤ectively collapses
to
du(h0j)
dh (possibly multiplied by an irrelevant constant), and since u () is
concave by assumption.
 Thirdly (unlike for Dasgupta et al.), we want to move beyond concepts
of the type of Denition 1 and Denition 4, to concepts of the type of
Denition 3, that allow us explore how the implications of arbitrary weight
sets. This is likely to be useful since while decision makers may be unable
to assign precise tradeo¤ weights to health gains for di¤erent population
groups, they may be quite able to reject both grossly inequality-sensitive
and inequality-insensitive weights, and hence make statements such as "a
health gain to the most deprived population subgroup is worth between
120 and 140% of the same health gain to the least deprived population
subgroup".
4. Example
4.1. The resource allocation problem
In this section, we present a numerical example to illustrate the concepts
developed above. The example is based on a model of treatment for depression,
described in Morton et al. (2008). Two features of depression are salient. One
is that is that the temporal characteristics of depression are very variable: some
su¤erers may experience a single episode of depression and then recover fully,
while others may experience recurrent episodes, while still others may experience
an extended, unremitting chronic depressive episode. One of the challenges in
treating depression cost-e¤ectively is therefore to nd ways to target resources
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to su¤erers whose illness will not spontaneously remit without treatment, hence
the popularity of "stepped care" models (NICE, 2004). Another relevant feature
of depression is its relatively high population prevalence - e.g. 2.6% in the UK
according to the Psychological Morbidity Survey of 2000 according to Singleton
et al (2001) - and the presence of signicant unmet need for care (Andrews and
Henderson, 2000).
Depression has three severity levels, and these three severity levels are crossed
with the transitory/ recurrent/ chronic distinction suggested above, to give nine
population groups in total. For an inequality averse social planner, treatments
that benet those in the most unfortunate group should be prioritised. How-
ever, while it is clear that, for example moderate recurrent depression is worse
than moderate transitory depression, it is not clear how it stands relative to
severe transitory depression. Hence the population groups cannot be ordered,
but they can be quasi-ordered as shown in Figure 3 (population groups will
henceforth be referred to using the 3-letter codes on the gure). The intended
interpretation of Figure 3 is that severe chronic is worse than severe recurrent
and moderate chronic depression and so on. We dene A by requiring that the
weight attached to alternatives that benet worse o¤ patients is constrained to
be higher than the weight for less badly-o¤ patients, requiring weights across
the nine patient groups to sum to 1, and requiring that the weight assigned
to alternative projects benetting su¤erers of mild transitory depression is at
least 1=12 (bearing in mind that weights across all nine categories must sum to
unity). The use of 1=12 as a lower bound for the weight of the lowest priority
group is purely illustrative, and other numbers could be chosen.
Figure 3. Ordering of depression subgroups
We consider three sorts of mutually exclusive alternatives for each population
group: improving coverage, improving the treatment mix as per NICE guide-
line at current treatment levels, and improving both coverage and treatment
mix (with the exception of MIT, for whom we only model extending coverage;
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appropriate treatment for this group consists primarily of watchful waiting and
so there is little to be done with improving treatment mix). The problem is
thus one for which there are multiple clusters of mutually exclusive interventions
(Johannesson and Weinstein, 1993). Where decisions variables are discrete this
is known in the operations research literature as the multiple choice knapsack
problem (Kellerer et al., 2004). Costs and benets of these alternatives as
shown in Table 4. Benet estimates draw on modelling described in Morton
et al. (2008); costs draw on Secta (2004). We will suppose that costs com-
bine additively and there is a xed budget available for expenditure, i.e. thatX
i2M
cixi  B for some budget B .
Benets (QALY 000s) Costs (£ ms)
Mix Cov Both Mix Cov Both
1. Mild transitory (MIT) - 1.2 - - 13.7 -
2. Moderate transitory (MOT) 0.1 4 4.2 2.6 13.3 17.7
3. Severe transitory (SET) 0 3 3.1 2 5.1 8.3
4. Mild recurrent (MIR) 0 0.4 0.5 10.1 9.5 26.3
5. Moderate recurrent (MOR) 0.3 1.7 2.1 15 14.1 39.2
6. Severe recurrent (SER) 0.6 3.5 4.5 9.9 10.6 27.1
7. Mild chronic (MIC) 0.1 0.3 0.5 4.1 2.8 9.8
8. Moderate chronic (MOC) 0.3 0.9 1.3 5 3.4 11.7
9. Severe chronic (SEC) 0.2 0.8 1.3 2.4 1.6 5.6
Table 4. Costs and benets for investment alternatives for depression
Hence, we have all the components of a MCO problem of the form (9). We
will consider now consider how to characterise the A-e¢ cient solutions in both
continuous and discrete versions of the problem.
4.2. Analysis of the continuous version
From a formal point of view, we are interested in nding A-e¢ cient solutions
to the MCO problem, which is a specialisation of problem (9).
max
x
P
i2M1
ixi; :::;
P
i2MP
ixi
such thatX
i2M
cixi  B (i)X
i2Mk
xi = 1 8k 2 P (ii)
x 2 [0; 1]M (iii)
(12)
In this formulation, P =f1; :::; Pg with P = 9 andM =f1; :::;Mg withM =
25 are the index sets for the population groups and alternatives respectively.
M1 throughMP is a partitioning ofM into alternatives consumed by each of
the population groups. Constraint (i) is the budget constraint; constraints (ii)
ensure that only one alternative is chosen for each population group; constraint
(iii) ensures the decision variables lie in [0; 1].
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For each weight vector  a family of solutions to (12) for all values of B can
be generated by an algorithm described in Johannesson and Weinstein (1993).
This algorithm is proved optimal in Section 1 of Sinha and Zoltners (1979), a fact
which seems not to be known in the health economics literature (Johannesson
and Weinstein cite a 1991 unpublished PhD thesis in Swedish as their authority).
There are three stages to the algorithm: (i) the elimination within cluster of
dominated alternatives, (ii) ordering of the remaining alternatives within cluster
by cost and computation of the incremental cost e¤ectiveness ratios, and nally
(iii) ranking of the resulting incremental increases in provision. Since the
clusters are population groups, and weights are specic to population groups,
the dominance relation does not depend on the choice of  and we are able
to carry out steps (i) and (ii) in the usual manner. (In fact, elimination of
dominated alternatives leads to the elimination of all the "Mix" alternatives,
leaving 17 alternatives, two for each population group except MIT.)
Carrying out step (iii) without knowledge of which  is to be applied is
problematic, however. Hence, we turn the problem around, asking, for any
pair of increments i0 and i00 is there a choice of  which leads to i0 being less
cost-e¤ective than i00? This can be done by solving the following linear program:
min

k(i0)i0k=ci0   k(i00)i00k=ci00 such that  2 A (13)
In the event that the value of (13) is greater than 0, then it is impossi-
ble for increment i0 to be ranked lower than increment i00 by any choice of .
Performing pairwise tests in this manner generates a quasi-ordering of alterna-
tives: this can be interpreted as the intersection quasi-ordering for all possible
cost-e¤ectiveness orderings for all  2 A. Solving such linear programs is
straightforward and was done in MSExcel using the solver add-in. The result-
ing quasi-ordering for the depression example is shown as Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Quasi-ordering of alternatives for treating depression
The interpretation of the gure is that an alternative i0 is superordinate to
another alternative i00 in the order (it is possible to trace a sequence of tail-
head arrows going from i00 to i0) if and only if it has a higher benet-cost score
for all feasible weights in the set A. Thus, all A-e¢ cient solutions to the
continuous MCO resource allocation problem (12) can be generated by starting
at one of the heads of the graph (the nodes with no outgoing arrows, either
improve coverage for SET or improve coverage for SEC ) and proceeding down
the graph selecting increments in such a way that no increment is selected before
all the increments superordinate to it in the graph until funds are exhausted.
In summary, insofar as alternatives are more superordinate or "higher up" on
this gure, they are more robust to variations in the weights attached to the
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di¤erent population groups because they will always be prioritised earlier than
alternatives less superordinate or "lower down" in the ordering.
To make this clear, the numbering of the alternatives in Figure 4 shows the
order in which increments will be selected when weights are 1/6 for population
groups SEC, SER and MOC, and 1/12 for all other population groups. The
reader can verify that no increment is selected before all the increments super-
ordinate to it are selected (e.g. "Cov for MOC" is not selected until "Cov for
SER", "Cov for SEC" and "Cov for SET" are selected).
4.3. Analysis of the discrete version
We now turn our attention to the A-e¢ cient solutions of the problem of the
form:
max
x
P
i2M1
ixi; :::;
P
i2MP
ixi
such thatX
i2M
cixi  B (i)X
i2Mk
xi = 1 8k 2 P (ii)
x 2 f0; 1gM (iii)
(14)
This is identical to problem (12) except that constraint (iii) ensures that
the decision variables cannot take fractional values.
As is well-known, the mono-criterion version of the problem (14), even with-
out the multiple choice constraints (ii), is NP-hard. Although customised al-
gorithms to solve this problem do exist, hand solution is generally impractical
for all but the simplest cases. Moreover, as the budget increases, items may
both enter and leave the optimal solution, hence there is no analogous ordering
to the cost-e¤ectiveness ordering of the previous section.
In general, as in the mono-criterion environment, solving combinatorial MCO
problems is more di¢ cult than solving linear MCO problems, requiring both
greater algorithmic ingenuity and computer processing time. Indeed, while
algorithms for multicriteria linear programs have been well-known for some time
(Steuer, 1986), algorithms for multicriteria integer and combinatorial problems
are very much a live research eld (Ehrgott and Gandibleux, 2000; Alves and
Clímaco, 2007). To identify the A-e¢ cient solutions for problem (14) we use
a computer code which implements the algorithm described in Argyris et al.
(2011). The idea of the algorithm is form a single combinatorial optimisation
problem with both choice of alternative x and weights Ak variable, and solve
multiple times, progressively cutting o¤ solutions after they have been identied.
We have run this algorithm for a budget constraint of £ 100m and show
the results of the analysis in Figure 5. For each population group, the chart
shows the proportion of A-e¢ cient solutions that includes each of the "mix",
"coverage" or "both" alternatives (bearing in mind that only one alternative can
be selected for each population group). The results are similar to the results
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of the analysis of the continuous version of the problem (for example, note that
in no A-e¢ cient solution is the dominated "mix" alternative selected; for the
population groups MIR and MOR for whom upgrading from the "coverage" to
the "both" alternative is highly cost-ine¤ective, that upgrade is not included in
any A-e¢ cient solution). This display is a variant of the core index display of
Liesiö et al (2007), although that display is designed for a context without the
multiple choice constraints (ii) of (14).
Figure 5. Proportion of time a solution is included in an A-e¢ cient solution
It can be seen that even with this relatively limited information about the
weights of health gains to di¤erent populations, it is possible to arrive at quite
crisp conclusions about what to do: one should implement the "both" alternative
for SER and SEC and the "coverage" alternative for MIT and MOR. Thus,
out of nine population groups for whom one has to make a decision, the model
gives recommendations about what to do for four of them. In an application
context, this could be quite useful to a decision maker who would then be able
to focus attention on the value tradeo¤s that bear directly on the undecided
population groups.
We note that a similar analysis can be done in the continuous case, as de-
scribed in the previous section. One way to do this is randomly simulate
weights from A. This can be done be using standard methods to simulate
weights uniformly from the unit simplex (using algorithm 2 of Onn and Weis-
man, 2011), then rejecting (Ross, 2002) weight vectors that do not fulll the
stipulated weight constraints. Then one can use each set of simulated weights to
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generate a priority ordering, and allocate resources by proceeding down the pri-
ority ordering ordering until the budget is exhausted. Finally, the proportion of
simulation iterations for which the coverage and both options are implemented
(as the mix option by itself is dominated in all cases) can be calculated for each
population subgroup. For 500 iterations, the resulting chart is shown in Figure
6.
Figure 6. Proportion of time an alternative is included in a simulated optimal
solution
It can be seen that while the specic numbers in Figures 5 and 6 are di¤erent,
the qualitative messages are similar. For example, implementing coverage for
MIT and MOR and both for SEC is denitely a good idea according to both
displays, and implementing both for SER is certainly worthwhile under Figure
5 and almost certainly worthwhile in Figure 6. The only population subgroup
that might be left without any change either in intervention mix or coverage
is MIR in both charts. Hence these gures underscore that what is critically
important in analysis is the problem frame, the data, and the constraints that
are placed on social values: the ne technical details of the formulation of the
model and solution procedure have rather minimal bearing on the resulting
decision recommendations.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have outlined a formal model of the healthcare resource
allocation problem, drawing on the welfare economic theory of health. We have
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shown how the key uncertainties about values which make parameterising such
models problematic can be easily handled within a multicriteria formulation.
We have moreover demonstrated how such formulations might be applied in
practice using an example based on the allocation of funds for the treatment of
various forms of depression.
Some years ago, Smith (1995) argued that "far from being a strength, the
stark clarity of mathematical models may make them unacceptable to the ac-
countable person" (p 154), forcing the decision maker to make unacceptably
explicit value judgements. Understanding relevant tradeo¤s is a hallmark of
rational decision and we do not wish to suggest that responsible analysts should
hide from decision makers the consequences of their choices. Nevertheless, an
important insight of Smiths paper is that an excessive focus on specifying the
maximand can distract from making decisions and engender needless conict
- to take a trivially simple but nevertheless instructive case, a decision maker
faced with a choice between giving an equal benet (such as a QALY) to person
A or person B only needs to know which of the two candidates is more deserving,
not quantitatively how much more deserving they are.
The advantage of the formulations presented in this paper is that they can
be used, at best to help decision makers make rational, e¢ cient choices in a
situation where provision of precise parameters expressing key value tradeo¤s
is di¢ cult; and at worst, to focus attention on the key, decision-relevant, value
tradeo¤s at stake. Moreover, our approach relates more naturally to the un-
derpinning welfare economic theory of healthcare resource allocation than ap-
proaches based on specifying equity constraints requiring particular levels or
shares of health or resources for particular population subgroups, or approaches
based on dening an equity criterion amongst other criteria.
Will the set ofA-e¢ cient solutions be unmanageably large and diverse? Per-
haps, but under plausible conditions, this seems unlikely. Value di¤erences that
seem unbridgeable when the debate is framed as one of principle (should the
healthcare system treat smokers and non-smokers di¤erently?) may seem much
more manageable when presented as questions about parameter choice (how
much priority do we want to give nonsmokers over smokers in access to health-
care?). Morever, much healthcare decision making takes place in a deliberative
setting, where the key players genuinely strive to understand opposing views.
In such an environment, di¤erences in values, and the parameter intervals rep-
resenting these di¤erences in values, are likely to shrink rather than grow as
discussion progresses. As parameter intervals become narrower, the number of
A-e¢ cient solutions will become smaller and these solutions will become more
similar.
Overall, we think the multicriteria methods that we propose in this paper
have great potential in healthcare resource allocation. Healthcare is an envi-
ronment where values are inevitably contested, as it concerns the distribution of
goods of an unusually fundamental nature. The present paper has focussed on
preferences over distribution, but there are still deeper ethical issues which re-
main to be explored: for example, should the maximand be a function of health
at all, or capability, well-being or monetised economic activity? Multicriteria
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formulations similar to those which we present in this paper have a great deal to
o¤er health economists who wish to be able to make robust recommendations
when all these perspectives point to the same decisions, and to illuminate the
key tradeo¤s when values do indeed conict.
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